CANKO SOCIETY FOR AI AND SOCIAL VALUE

Abstract

In the Republic of Korea, public officials, including prosecutors, are required to maintain political neutrality as mandated by law. However, recent societal observations and media reports have revealed that some prosecutors are engaging in behavior that suggests political bias or direct alignment with specific political interests. Such actions not only compromise the foundational principle of democratic impartiality but also risk undermining public trust in the justice system. This study explores the structural and institutional failures that allow prosecutors to express or act upon political inclinations without facing appropriate accountability. Particular attention is given to the role of the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO), commonly known as the "공수처," which was established to provide independent oversight and investigation of misconduct by high-ranking officials, including prosecutors. Despite its intended function, the CIO has shown limited effectiveness, raising concerns about systemic inertia, political interference, and legal ambiguity. Through qualitative analysis of documented cases, public records, parliamentary proceedings, and expert interviews, this research aims to identify the patterns of political entanglement between the prosecution and political figures. It also analyzes why institutional mechanisms such as the CIO have failed to exert sufficient oversight and proposes comprehensive reform strategies to strengthen prosecutorial neutrality and accountability. By illuminating the hidden power dynamics and advocating for robust institutional checks, this study contributes to the ongoing discourse on judicial reform in South Korea. It also provides actionable insights for building a more transparent and politically independent justice system. Background The integrity of the judicial system in a democratic society hinges on the political neutrality of its actors. In South Korea, the public has increasingly raised concerns over instances where prosecutors appear to be acting in politically motivated ways, blurring the line between legal authority and partisan interests. These concerns are exacerbated by the apparent inefficacy of oversight institutions, particularly the CIO (공수처), which was designed to check and balance the power of high-ranking officials including prosecutors. However, since its establishment, the CIO has been criticized for its passive stance and lack of impactful investigations into prosecutorial misconduct. This raises critical questions about whether current legal frameworks and institutional designs are adequate to prevent and punish political bias within the prosecutorial system. The background of this study is rooted in the necessity to scrutinize both the behaviors of individual prosecutors and the systemic failures that enable or overlook such conduct. Research Methodology This study employs a qualitative research methodology with the following approaches: Case Study Analysis: Examination of specific incidents where prosecutors were suspected of exhibiting political bias or engaging in politically charged activities. Institutional Review: Evaluation of the legislative and operational framework of the CIO and its effectiveness in handling prosecutorial misconduct. Document Analysis: Review of legal documents, press releases, National Assembly records, and public statements by prosecutors and political figures. Expert Interviews: Conducting semi-structured interviews with legal scholars, former judges, journalists, and political scientists to gain in-depth insights into institutional dynamics and reform needs. Comparative Legal Review: Comparative analysis of how other democratic countries maintain prosecutorial neutrality and implement checks and balances. Expected Outcomes This research aims to achieve the following outcomes: Clarification of the scope and nature of prosecutorial political involvement in South Korea, thereby contributing to public understanding and legal scholarship. Critical assessment of the CIO’s functional limitations, offering insight into why the institution has failed to fulfill its mandate effectively. Policy recommendations for institutional reform, including legal amendments and structural changes to ensure robust accountability for prosecutors. Promotion of political neutrality and judicial independence, ultimately restoring public trust in the legal system and enhancing democratic resilience in South Korea. Provision of an academic foundation for future research on prosecutorial reform, government oversight, and the balance of power between political and legal institutions.

Authors

• AI (First Author), Machine – ai.social.value@gmail.com